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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a lobby game, modelled as an all-pay
auction in which interest groups submit bids in order to obtain a
political prize. The bids are restricted to be below a cap imposed by
the government. For both an incomplete and a complete information
setting we show the following results. While ex post a lower cap
may lead to higher lobbying expenditures, ex ante a lower cap always
implies lower expected total lobbying expenditures. The incompletely
informed government maximizes social welfare by implementing a cap
equal to zero.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Lobbying has become an established practice in modern democracies. Its
role in society is an intriguing phenomenon, and it has received a lot of
attention from game theorists. Tullock (1980) views lobbying as an all-pay
auction, in which interest groups submit “bids” in order to win a political
prize. The literature that follows Tullock focuses mainly on the social costs
of lobbying, which are associated with the fact that the money spent on
lobbying cannot be used for other economic activities. Therefore, this branch
of the literature devotes much attention to the calculation of total lobbying
expenditures by the interest groups (Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Amann and
Leiniger, 1995, 1996; Krishna and Morgan, 1997). Another stream of work
focuses on the social beneﬁts of lobbying, which arise when interest groups
have the opportunity to separate themselves choosing bids that are contingent
on policy relevant private information. This stream of work views lobbying
as a signaling game, in which interest groups submit informative signals to
the government (Potters and Van Winden, 1992; Lohmann, 1993; Lagerlöf,
1997).
In this study, we combine the two views of the literature on lobbying by
m a k i n gat r a d e - o ﬀ between social costs and social beneﬁts of lobbying. We
do so, taking Tullock’s all-pay auction model, and investigating the eﬀect of a
cap on the amount of money interest groups are allowed to spend on lobbying.
We assume that the cap is chosen by the government with the target of
maximizing social welfare. In deciding the optimal cap, the government needs
to make a trade-oﬀ between the informational beneﬁts lobbying provides,
and the social costs. The trade-oﬀ turns out to be non-trivial, as both total
2lobbying expenditures and informational beneﬁts are higher with a higher
cap.
We will focus on the following two questions. “What eﬀect would a cap on
lobbying expenditures have on their total?” and “Should there be legislation
to introduce such a cap in order to increase social welfare?” While the latter
question is not answered yet by the economic literature, the former one is
addressed in Che and Gale (1998). Their ﬁndings challenge the intuitively
appealing expectation that a cap on lobbying expenditures decreases their
total. They show that a cap “may have the perverse eﬀect of increasing
aggregate expenditures and lowering total surplus”.
Before answering these questions, we need to emphasize the importance of
distinction between the ex ante and ex post eﬀect of a cap. The distinction is
important as it allows us to model the legislative role of the government. New
legislation, once introduced, regulates all lobbying activities for a long period
of time. As a result, when taking a legislative initiative, the government
cannot predict the exact eﬀect of a proposed cap. It is therefore appropriate
to model the government’s decision on a cap as an ex ante choice, i.e., a
decision made before the government learns the realizations of the interest
groups’ values. In contrast, the “perverse eﬀe c t ”d e s c r i b e db yC h ea n dG a l e
holds ex post, i.e., after the interest groups’ values are realized.
Depending on the situation, the interest groups may be or may not be
better informed than the government about the characteristics of other in-
terest groups. In this paper, we will investigate the eﬀe c to fac a pi nt w o
diﬀerent settings. In an incomplete information setting, we assume that each
interest group is privately informed about its own value for the prize. The
3government and the other interest groups only know the distribution func-
tion this value is drawn from. In a complete information setting, we assume,
following Che and Gale, that the interest groups commonly know each oth-
ers’ values. However, the government is only aware of the value distribution
function.
Our contribution is threefold. First, in the case of incompletely informed
interest groups, we derive equilibrium bidding in the case that the interest
groups are confronted with a cap. Second, we show that the ex ante expected
lobbying expenditures decrease by imposing a cap. Thus, legislators need not
be overly concerned about the “perverse eﬀect” of a cap, in contrast to what
the result of Che and Gale suggests. Third, we point out that the government
should optimally ban lobbying by imposing a prohibitive cap. Although a
high cap generates information beneﬁts by allowing the government to choose
the socially optimal action more often, we show that these beneﬁts do not
outweigh the expected social costs.
Two other papers are closely related to ours. McAfee and McMillan
(1992) show that weak cartels optimally let all cartel members submit zero
bids in the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. The proof of this result follows the
same logic as the proof of the optimality of a prohibitive cap in the incomplete
information setting. Also, for the incomplete information setting, Gavious et
al. (2001) simultaneously and independently develop alternative proofs for
the results on equilibrium bidding and ex ante total lobbying expenditures
in the all-pay auction with caps.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we outline the structure of our model.
In Section 3, we derive the results about the eﬀe c to fac a pi nt h ei n c o m p l e t e
4information setting. In Section 4, we show that these results hold in the
complete information setting. In Section 5 we conclude with some critical
remarks on the results, and with an indication for some directions for further
research.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider the following lobby game. There is a government, G,w h i c ho w n sa
political prize,1 and n interest groups, numbered 1,...,n.L e t
N ≡ {1,...,n}
denote the set of all interest groups. We will use i and k to represent typical
interest groups in N. Interest groups participate in the all-pay auction, in
which they submit bids2 in order to obtain the prize. We will let bi denote
the bid submitted by interest group i. G restricts bi to be contained in the
interval [0,c],w h e r ec denotes a cap. The interest group that submits the
highest bid wins, but each interest group has to pay its bid. In case of ties,
the winner is chosen among the interest groups with the highest bid with
equal probabilities.
Each interest group i learns its private value vi of the prize. The vi’s are
drawn, independently from each other, from a distribution function F. F
1The prize could for instance be a license to operate in a certain market, a building
contract, or the right to organize an important event.
2We use the terminology from the literature on all-pay auctions and refer to the amount
paid by an interest groups as its bid. Direct bribes, writing research reports, or hiring
lobbyists are instances of bids. We use the term total lobbying expeditures for the sum of
all bids.
5has support on the interval [0,1], and has a continuous density function f
with f(vi) > 0, for every vi ∈ [0,1]. We consider two information structures.
In the incomplete information setting, each interest group only knows its
own value, and not the values of the other interest groups. In the complete
information setting, the values of all interest groups are commonly known
among the interest groups. In both settings, G is incompletely informed,
and only knows F.
We assume that interest groups are risk neutral expected utility maximiz-
ers. Let ui(k,vi,b i) be the utility of interest group i when its value is vi,i t s




vi − bi if k = i
−bi otherwise.
(1)
G chooses c that maximizes ex ante social welfare among the interest
groups. Let SW(k,v1,...,vn,b 1,...,bn) denote ex post social welfare given
that interest group k wins, given the values v1,...,vn,a n dt h eb i d sb1,...,bn.
Ex post social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of interest groups’ utilities, so
that







Ex ante social welfare is the expectation of ex post social welfare over the
values and the played strategies. We assume that interest groups play a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
63 Incomplete information
Consider the incomplete information setting. Before we establish our main
results, we derive two useful lemmas and a corollary. Deﬁne the diﬀerentiable






















for all y ∈ [0,1].
Lemma 1 C is strictly increasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 D is strictly increasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 3 If c ≤ 1 −
1 R
0
F(z)n−1dz,t h e nt h e r ei sau n i q u eξ for which
D(ξ)=c.
Proof. See the Appendix.




and let v∗(c)=1otherwise. Proposition 4 shows that in equilibrium, the
7strategy of interest groups with a value below the threshold value v∗(c) is
not aﬀected by the cap. Interest groups with a value above v∗(c) submit a
bid equal to c. This equilibrium is derived using an indirect approach based
on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981), which states that an
interest group’s interim utility (i.e., its utility as a function of its private
value) is entirely determined by the function that assigns a probability that
the interest group wins the prize given each possible realization of its value
(provided that the utility of an interest groups is zero when is has the lowest
possible value). As the bid function (3) determines this probability function,
the interim utility for each interest group is ﬁxed. In order to prove that (3)
is an equilibrium, we show that the interim utility of each interest group is
compatible with (3).







[F(vi)n−1 − F(z)n−1]dz if vi ∈ [0,v ∗(c)]
c if vi ∈ (v∗(c),1],
(3)




v∗(c)=1otherwise. Then B constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the lobby game.3




Myerson (1981) shows that in equilibrium, the interim utility πi(vi) of interest




Qi(wi)dwi, for all vi ∈ [0,1] and i ∈ N,( 4 )
3For an alternative proof, derived simultaneously and independently, see Gavious et al.
(2001). The result can also be derived indirectly from Laﬀont and Robert (1996).
8where Qi(wi) is the conditional probability that interest group i wins the
prize, given that it has value wi.
The proposed bid function implies that
Qi(p,wi)=F(wi)
n−1 if wi ∈ [0,v
∗(c)],( 5 )
as B(wi,c) is strictly increasing in wi for all wi ∈ [0,v∗(c)],a n d
Qi(wi)= ¯ Q =
1 − F(v∗(c))n
n(1 − F(v∗(c)))
if wi ∈ (v
∗(c),1].( 6 )
The last expression follows from the ex ante probability (i.e., before the
















It remains to be checked if B is compatible with (4). As πi(0) = 0,w i t h( 5 )





n−1dwi,i fvi ∈ [0,v








¯ Qdwi,i fvi ∈ (v
∗(c),1] (8)
for all i ∈ N. Moreover, the expected utility of interest group i can be
expressed as follows
πi(vi)=F(vi)
n−1vi − b(vi,c) if vi ∈ [0,v
∗(c)],a n d ( 9 )
πi(vi)= ¯ Qvi − b(vi,c) if vi ∈ (v
∗(c),1],( 10)
9where b(vi,c) is the bid made by an interest group with value vi when the cap
equals c. It is readily veriﬁed that the proposed bid function B is a solution
to (7)-(10). Therefore, B constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 implies that imposing a lower cap can ex post lead to higher
lobbying expenditures. This can be seen as follows. It is readily veriﬁed that
the equilibrium bid function makes a jump upwards at threshold value v∗(c).
Now, take v1,...,vn and c such that v2,...,vn <v ∗(c),a n dv1 = v∗(c).A s
v∗ is the inverse function of D,b yL e m m a2 ,v∗ is strictly increasing in c.
Therefore, when c is marginally decreased, interest group 1 will change its
bid to c, which is higher than its original bid, whereas the bids of the other
bidders remain unchanged, so that total lobbying expenditures increase.
Thus, there are two opposing eﬀects of a decrease in c. On the one hand,
it lowers the bids of interest groups with high values, which on the other hand
induces interest groups with intermediate values to increase their bid to c so
as to pool with the high types and to increase their probability of winning
the prize. Depending on the speciﬁc values, the second eﬀect sometimes
dominates the ﬁrst.
Proposition 5 shows that the “ex post” result does not hold “ex ante”.
Let ex ante expected total lobbying expenditures be the expected sum of
interest groups’ equilibrium bids, where the expectation is taken over the
values of the interest groups. The proof follows by calculating the sum of the
equilibrium bids given by Proposition 4 as a function of c,a n db ys h o w i n g
that the resulting function is strictly increasing in c.
Proposition 5 Consider the lobby game with incomplete information. Sup-
10pose that c is strictly decreased. Then ex ante expected total lobbying expen-
ditures are strictly decreased as well.
Proof. Let ˜ La(c) denote the expected ex ante total lobbying expenditures
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Now, as v∗ is the inverse function of D,b yL e m m a2 ,v∗ is strictly increasing
in c.T h e n ,b yL e m m a1, ˜ La(c) is strictly increasing in c.
Proposition 5 implies that if total lobbying expenditures were the only
part of social welfare, then a lower cap would always be preferred to a higher
one. However, social welfare as deﬁned in (2) is also an increasing function
of the winner’s private value. As v∗(c) is strictly increasing in c,al o w e rc a p
leads to more bidders pooling at the cap, so that the probability that the
11winner is the interest group with the highest value decreases. Therefore, a
lower cap implies less informational beneﬁts.
The trade-oﬀ between social costs and social beneﬁts is non-trivial. In
order to make the trade-oﬀ, we make the simplifying assumption that 1−F
f is
a strictly decreasing function, which is the case for several standard distrib-
utions such as the uniform distribution. Suppose that G is not restricted in
letting the interest groups play the all-pay auction, but that it has a much
broader class of feasible mechanisms to choose from.
We start by deﬁning a mechanism. In a mechanism, interest groups are
asked to simultaneously and independently choose an action. Interest group
i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai,w h e r eAi is the set of actions for interest group
i. The mechanism has the following outcome functions
b p : A1 × ... × An → <
n,
and
b x : A1 × ... × An → <
n.
If a =( a1,...,an),t h e nb pi(a) is interpreted as the probability that interest
group i gets the prize and b xi(a) is the expected expenditures for interest
group i.I n t e r e s tg r o u pi’s utility when a is played is, consistently with (1),
given by
ˆ Ui(a)=vib pi(a) − b xi(a).
Let a strategy be a function b bi :[ 0 ,1] → Ai such that b bi(vi) is the ac-
tion interest group i plays when it has value vi. A feasible mechanism is
a mechanism including strategies, which have the following properties: (1)
each interest group expects nonnegative utility, and (2) the strategies form a
12Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. A socially optimal auction is
a feasible mechanism that maximizes ex ante social welfare.
By the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1981), we may assume, without
loss of generality, that G only considers feasible direct revelation mechanisms,
which is are feasible mechanisms in which each interest group is asked to
announce its value, in which it has an incentive to participate (individual
rationality) and in which it has an incentive to announce its value honestly
(incentive compatibility). Let (p,x) be a feasible direct revelation mecha-
nism, with







x : V → <
n.
We interpret pi(v) as the probability that interest group i wins, and xi(v) as
the expected payment by i when v ≡ (v1,...,vn) is announced.
Let
Qi(p,vi) ≡ Ev−i{pi(v)}
be the conditional probability that interest group i wins given its value vi,
and
Ui(p,x,vi) ≡ viQi(p,vi) − Ev−i{xi(v)}
beinterestgroupi’s interim utility from (p,x),w i t hv−i ≡ (v1,...,v i−1,v i+1,...,vn).
Myerson (1981) shows that individual rationality and incentive compatibility
13are equivalent to




Qi(p,yi)dyi, ∀vi,i,a n d ( 12)
Ui(p,x,0) ≥ 0, ∀i.( 13)















































The ﬁrst equality follows from (12), and the second by integration by parts.
The ﬁrst inequality follows from a theorem from Statistics which tells that the
expectation of a product is less or equal than the product of the expectations
in case the ﬁrst term of the product is strictly decreasing, and the second term
is increasing (McAfee and McMillan, 1992). Here, 1−F
f is strictly decreasing
14(by assumption), and Qi is increasing vi (by (11)). The other manipulations
are straightforward.






for all i. Basically, (˜ p, ˜ x) is a lottery in which each interest group has the
same probability of winning. The expected social welfare among the interest
groups is then expected value generated by the lottery, so that
˜ S(˜ p, ˜ x)=E{vi}.
With (14) it follows that (˜ p, ˜ x) is a socially optimal mechanism, as
˜ S(˜ p, ˜ x) ≥ ˜ S(p,x)
for all feasible direct revelation mechanisms (p,x). (˜ p, ˜ x) is straightforwardly
implemented with c =0 .
Proposition 6 Consider the lobby game with incomplete information. If
1−F
f is strictly decreasing, then c =0maximizes ex ante social welfare.
An intuition behind Proposition 6 is the following. Observe in the second
line of the chain (14) that player i, if winning the object, adds
1−F(vi)
f(vi) to social
welfare. As, by assumption, 1−F
f is a strictly decreasing function, G prefers
a low type of interest group i to win more often than a high type. However,
(11) requires the probability for interest group i to win the object to be
(weakly) increasing in vi. Hence, the best G can do is make the probability
15that a low type wins equal to the probability that a high type wins. G can
do this optimally by implementing a cap equal to zero.
4 Complete information
Consider the complete information setting with two interest groups. For
completeness, we ﬁr s tr e p o r tt h eﬁnding by Che and Gale (1998) showing
that ex post lobbying expenditure may increase as a result of a decrease in c.
Let vh ≡ max{v1,v 2} and vl ≡ min{v1,v 2} and let Lp(c,vh,v l) be the ex
post expected total lobbying expenditures by both interest groups, given the
cap c, vh and vl.W e s p e a k o f expected total lobbying expenditures as in
equilibrium, interest groups play mixed strategies (Che and Gale, 1998).
Proposition 7 Consider the lobby game with complete information. Let
n =2 . Then generically, there is a unique Nash equilibrium,4 in which
















,t h e nLp(c,vh,v l) >L p(∞,v h,v l)
Proof. See Che and Gale (1998).
Note that for a non-zero mass of realizations of c, vh,a n dvl, Lp(c,vh,v l) >
Lp(∞,v h,v l), which implies that there is a substantial set of cases in which
4For the zero mass event c = vl/2, there a continuum of equilibria, which results in
total lobbying expenditures in the interval [vl(vh +vl)/2vh,2c].S e eC h ea n dG a l e( 1998).
16a decrease in c results in an increase in total lobbying expenditures. The
intuition behind this result is that a decrease in the cap limits the interest
group with the highest value, so that the interest group with the lowest value
is willing to bid more aggressively, which in certain cases leads to an increase
in total lobbying expenditures.
Assume that each interest group draws its value from a uniform distri-
bution on the interval [0,1]. We calculate ex ante expected total lobbying
expenditures taking the expectation of (15) with respect to vl and vh.P r o p o -
sition 8 shows that ex ante total lobbying expenditures are always increasing
in the cap.
Proposition 8 Consider the lobby game with complete information. If n =
2 and vi ∼ U[0,1], then the ex ante expected total lobbying expenditures are
strictly increasing in c for all c ∈ [0, 1
2].
Proof. Let La(c) denote the ex ante expected total lobbying expendi-
















dvhdvl +2 c(1 − 2c)
2.
The expression is multiplied by 2 as the role of the interest group with the
higher and the lower value is interchanged with probability 1
2.T a k i n g t h e








dvh +2− 16c +2 4 c
2
=2 − 12c +1 6 c
2 − 8c
2 log(2c).




> 2 − 12c +1 6 c
2 − 8c
2(2c − 1) = 2(1 − 2c)
3 > 0.( 16)
Therefore, as La(c) is a continuous function of c, La(c) is strictly increasing
in c.
Proposition 9 shows that the c =0result of the incomplete information
setting has its parallel in the complete information setting. This result follows
from Che and Gale (1998), who show that for c>1
2vl, expected utility for the
bidder with the highest value is vh − vl, and expected utility for the bidder
with the lowest value equals 0. Hence, in this case, social welfare equals
vh − vl.I fc<1
2vl,b o t hb i d d e r sb i dc,s ot h a te xp o s ts o c i a lw e l f a r ei sg i v e n
by 1
2(vl + vh) − 2c. Taking the expectation of ex post social welfare with
respect to vh and vl, ex ante social welfare is determined. Straightforward
calculations reveal that ex ante social welfare is maximized at c =0 .
Proposition 9 Consider the lobby game with complete information. If n =
2 and vi ∼ U[0,1],t h e nc =0maximizes ex ante social welfare.
Proof. If vl > 2c, both interest groups bid c,s ot h a te xp o s ts o c i a l
welfare is given by
v1+v2
2 −2c,a n di fvl < 2c, expected utility for the interest
groups is vh − vl and 0 respectively for the high and the low value interest
18group (Che and Gale, 1998). Let S(c) denote ex ante social welfare as a

















The ﬁrst term of the RHS refers to the case that vl > 2c. The second term










The ﬁrst order derivative of S is then given by
dS(c)
dc
= −(1 − 2c)
2
≤ 0
so that S(c) is maximized at c =0 .
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Our results encourage governments to introduce caps on lobbying. We have
found for both the incomplete and the complete information setting that al-
though introducing caps on lobbying may ex post lead to an increase in total
lobbying expenditures, this eﬀect is reversed for ex ante expected total lob-
bying expenditures. Moreover, making the trade-oﬀ between social costs and
social beneﬁts of lobbying, we have shown that it is optimal for a benevolent
government to completely ban lobbying.
This conclusion, however, relies heavily on at least three debatable as-
sumptions. By far the strongest, and therefore most serious assumption, is
19that interest groups play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This assumption is
probably not valid in many real-life cases of political lobbying, as often, in-
terest groups cannot be viewed as a single entity, but are poorly organized
lobbies instead that suﬀer seriously from free-riding problems. Second, our
results are built on the assumption of a benevolent government which maxi-
m i z e ss o c i a lw e l f a r e ,w h i c ha tﬁr s ts i g h ts e e m st ob es t r o n ga sw e l l .H o w e v e r ,
also a self-interested government may rationally aim at maximal social wel-
fare, so that its probability of being re-elected is maximized. Finally, we have
limited the action space of the government to the choice of a cap on lobby-
ing expenditures. We implicitly assume that the government is not able to
implement other, probably more eﬃcient mechanisms such as auctions, for
instance because the constitution precludes this.5
There are several interesting directions for future research. For instance,
the analysis was simpliﬁed by the assumption of independence (the interest
groups’ values are drawn independently) and symmetry (the values are drawn
from the same distribution). The assumption of independence is not valid
when there are external factors which inﬂuence the interest groups’ values
equally. For instance, the value for a license to operate in a certain market
depends on consumer’s demand, which eﬀects the values for the diﬀerent
interest groups in the same direction. In this respect, extensions to mod-
els with aﬃliated values, interdependent values, or multidimensional signals
may provide additional insights. In Onderstal (2002), the model with incom-
plete information is extended to allow for interest group speciﬁc distribution
5See Moore (1992) and Palfrey (1992) for a survey of the literature on the implemen-
tation of eﬃcient mechanisms in environments with complete and incomplete information
respectively.
20functions. Onderstal shows that a cap of zero is still optimal, provided that
interest groups with low ex ante values (i.e., expected values) are not allowed
to participate in the lobby game.
6 Appendix




(n − 1)F(y)n − nF(y)n−1 +1
n




00(y)=( n − 1)f(y)F(y)
n−2(F(y) − 1) < 0
for all y ∈ [0,1). It immediately follows that C0(y) > 0 for all y<1.
Proof of Lemma 2. We deduce for all y ∈ [0,1),
D
0(y)=
[1 − F(y)][1 − F(y)n − yf(y)nF(y)n−1]+f(y)y[1 − F(y)n]




[1 − F(y)]2 ∗




[1 − F(y)]2 ∗ C
0(y)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. Therefore, D is strictly increas-
ing.




and D diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing (by Lemma 2), ξ is uniquely
determined.
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